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POSTCOLONIALISM AND THE TWO PUBLICS IN 







The concept of the public occupies a unique place in the 
understanding of democratic governance in Africa. However, 
its uniqueness is mediated by the fact that it is a trans-
conceptual notion with theoretical ties to many other 
concepts—nationalism, globalisation, popular culture, 
modernity, civil society, the political, democracy and so on. 
This trans-conceptual character is further interjected by the fact 
of the colonial intrusion in the conceptual history of African 
societies. The implication is therefore that any attempt at 
understanding the manifestation of this concept in its African 
context must be ready to follow it through its often convoluted 
path. Ekeh’s (1975) and Mbembe’s (2001) analyses constitute 
a firm grasp of the historical legacy of the notion of the public 
in Africa. However, Lawuyi’s (2012) recent attempt to ground 
an understanding of the public as the core of a “proposal to a 
new understanding of our [Nigerian] society” actually 
undermines that proposal rather than contribute to it. And it 
does this basically because it flouts the essential conceptual 
necessity underlying any application of that term.   
 
Introduction 
The idea of the public in postcolonial Africa, just like many 
other ideas and concepts, has a convoluted and often 
intractable conceptual history due mainly to the colonial 
intrusion in the conceptual history of African societies. This 
has therefore imposed a strict code of clarification on any 
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scholar utilising any of these concepts—nationalism, popular 
culture, modernity, philosophy, cinema, feminism, civil 
society, postcolonial, theory, the political, democracy, the list 
is endless. The implication of this is basically that it does not 
serve any purpose for a scholar to simply talk about any idea 
or concepts without taking adequate care to excavate the 
provenance and historical context as well as the translocal 
capacity of such a concept.  
 The concept of the public is one such concept whose 
significance lies in its capacity to be transconceptual. In other 
words, it is a concept that straddles most other concepts. In 
Africa, its importance derives from the attempts by African 
states, since the 90s, to come to term with the exigencies of 
democracy and democratisation as well as the urgent need to 
transform the African societies for the challenges of the 
twenty-first century. To contribute to these political efforts on 
the part of the African leadership, scholars in Africa have 
confronted the intricacies of the concept in an African context. 
We have the seminal work of notably Achille Mbembe (2001), 
Peter Ekeh (1975), Karin Barber (1997), and recently Olatunde 
Bayo Lawuyi (2012). 
 This essay will examine briefly the career of the 
concept of the public in African scholarship, especially its 
recent theoretical excavation by the anthropologist, Prof. O. B. 
Lawuyi. This recent effort is significant simply because, for 
me, it constitutes a concrete sociological exegesis that further 
problematises and extends Peter Ekeh’s seminal effort. While 
Ekeh’s “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa” theorises 
the public within a continental framework, Lawuyi’s inaugural 
lecture drives home its recent convoluted manifestation and 
implications within the democratic space in Nigeria.  
 However, it is my suspicion that his reading of the idea 
of the public, especially in its highlighted three dimensions, 
errs on the side of conceptual clarity which in the final analysis 
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hurts and undermines his central objective. My aim in this 
essay is to point out the bad side of an otherwise brilliant 
deduction about the career of the publics in Nigeria. I intend to 
rescue the baby of the sceptical public from the bathwater of 
rejection.  
 
Postcolonial Africa and the scourge of the commandement 
In his seminal work, On the Postcolony, Achille Mbembe 
critically outlines the architecture of an average postcolony in 
Africa coping with the ambivalent legacies of colonialism. For 
him, the post-colonial space is a space of political 
entanglement made up of a convoluted series of 
“discontinuities, reversals, inertias, and swings that overlay 
one another, interpenetrate one another, and envelope one 
another” (Mbembe, 2001: 14).  
 This entangled history of the postcolony results from 
two significant but correlated factors. The first is the malicious 
legacies of colonialism which ensured that the postcolonial 
realities in the postcolony would be such as to make the hope 
of independence fizzle out before it is ever realised. At the 
level of politics, economy and culture, Africans were left with 
an ambivalent desire for liberation which became short-
circuited upon independence (see Griffith, 1995). The second 
factor of entanglement derives from the complicated 
conviviality between dying colonialism and nascent 
nationalism in Nigeria (See Chinweizu, 2007; Zachernuk, 
2000).  
 The postcolony therefore becomes a joint invention 
characterised by  
...a distinctive style of political improvisation, 
by a tendency to excess and lack of proportion, 
as well as by distinctive ways identities are 
multiplied, transformed, and put into 
circulation. But the postcolony is also made up 
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of a series of corporate institutions and a 
political machinery that, once in place, 
constitute a distinctive regime of violence. In 
this sense, the postcolony is a particularly 
revealing, and rather dramatic, stage on which 
are played out the wider problems of subjection 
and its corollary, discipline (Mbembe, 2001: 
102-103).  
The regime of violence in the postcolony is continuous with 
that which colonialism instituted. This is because the 
postcolonial state inherited the logic of exploitation and 
subjugation essential to colonial administration. In this wise, 
Mbembe identifies two characteristic features of the 
postcolony in Africa. The first is that the postcolony and its 
dynamics generate state power—or the commandement—
which is the sole instrumentality in the subjection of the 
citizens. This state power (1) “creates, through administrative 
and bureaucratic practices, its own world of meaning—a 
master code that, while becoming the society’s primary central 
code, ends by governing, perhaps paradoxically, the logics that 
underlie all other meanings within that society; (2) attempts to 
institutionalize this world of meanings as a ‘socio-historical 
world’ and to make that world real, turning it into a part of 
people’s ‘common sense’ not only by instilling it in the minds 
of the…‘target population,’ but also by integrating it into the 
period’s consciousness” (ibid: 103).  
 The second characteristic of the postcolony is its 
capacity to be “chaotically pluralistic.”  In its attempt to create 
a system of meaning that will make the discipline of the target 
population possible, state power in the postcolony ends up 
creating a multiplicity of public spaces resulting from the equal 
attempt by the people to make sense of their collective 
predicament; their attempt, that is, to “rewrite the mythologies 
of power” (ibid: 108). The one dominant public space it desires 
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to enthrone is therefore bifurcated into several other public 
spaces with their own logics and common sense, and enabling 
the postcolonial subjects to bargain with state power in this 
“conceptual marketplace.”  
 For instance, given that the postcolonial leadership had 
to choose the national question over the social question due to 
its failure to interrogate the colonial legacies, the postcolonial 
space became a space given to much obscene excess and 
magnificence of state power. The commandement, in other 
words, generates a regime of public meanings with its own 
rationality defined by the corruptive excesses especially 
around the misappropriation of public funds. State power 
becomes a framework for enrichment as well as for the 
perpetuation of poverty.  
 The basic difference between Mbembe’s and Ekeh’s 
analysis of the postcolonial state lies in their different 
understanding of the dynamics of the publics generated by 
postcolonial state power. Ekeh argues that the experience of 
colonialism created two publics rather than one that 
characterise the social order in the West. For him, 
When one moves across Western society to 
Africa, at least, one sees that the total extension 
of the Western conception of politics in terms 
of a monolithic public realm morally bound to 
the private realm can only be made at 
conceptual and theoretical peril. There is a 
private realm in Africa. But this private realm is 
differentially associated with the public realm 
in terms of morality. In fact there are two public 
realms in post-colonial Africa, with different 
types of moral linkages to the private realm. At 
one level is the public realm in which 
primordial groupings, ties, and sentiments 
influence and determine the individual's public 
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behavior. I shall call this the primordial public 
because it is closely identified with primordial 
groupings, sentiments, and activities, which 
nevertheless impinge on the public interest. The 
primordial public is moral and operates on the 
same moral imperatives as the private realm. 
On the other hand, there is a public realm which 
is historically associated with the colonial 
administration and which has become identified 
with popular politics in post-colonial Africa. It 
is based on civil structures: the military, the 
civil service, the police, etc. Its chief 
characteristic is that it has no moral linkages 
with the private realm. I shall call this the civic 
public. The civic public in Africa is amoral and 
lacks the generalized moral imperatives 
operative in the private realm and in the 
primordial public (1975: ). 
Mbembe’s analysis, coming twenty six years after Ekeh’s, 
expanded the universe of the publics in Africa. Given the 
penchant of those at the helm of state power to use the 
commandement for personal aggrandisement, the 
disillusionment of the people and the need to make their 
suffering sufferable led to the evolution of a “conceptual 
marketplace” populated by several, rather than just two, 
publics, “each having its own logic yet liable to be entangled 
with other logics when operating in certain contexts” 
(Mbembe, 2001: 104). The political and social ingenuity of the 
postcolonial subject lies in his/her ability to manoeuvre 
through the conceptual spaces to achieve a counter-meaning 
opposed to the “official” construction of sense and order. For 
Ekeh, most of the people found that sense not in the civic 
public constructed by government, but in their primordial 
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public with its own architecture of meaning and political 
etiquette.  
 We then begin to fathom why the idea of the public 
plays a significant role in the understanding and effectiveness 
of any government. Indeed, as Ekeh points out, our earliest 
understanding of what politics is all about has to do with the 
activities of individuals, negative or positive, as they impinge 
on the public space (1975: 91). However, at another level, the 
idea of the public appears like an abstract entity which escapes 
our conceptual attention immediately we attempt to dress it up 
in clarifying words. In other words, we seem to hit a 
conceptual wall when we turn from talking about the public to 
attempting to clarify it. The question is: What is the public? 
This question is much more philosophical than asking ‘Who is 
the public?” This is because, as Hannay notes, the “who” of 
the public refers to you and I: 
But as we will see, that answer, if true, although 
scarcely informative enough at first glance for 
the question to be worth asking, is in fact highly 
significant. It is also rather complex, but seeing 
the complexity will put us then in a position to 
ask that first question in a somewhat different 
way. We will be able to ask both ‘what is the 
public?’ and ‘what became of it?’ (2005: 2) 
 To answer the “what” of the public demands 
conceptual clarity. And this, as we have noted earlier, must 
take into cognisance, first, the transconceptual nature of the 
notion of the public and, second, the intrinsic relationship 
between the public and the political. The status of the public 
space, to reiterate, derives from the fact that it is a space within 
which individuals “encounter each other with the intention of 
determining how their lives in common shall be lived” (Hénaff 
and Strong, 2001: 1). The implication of this therefore is that 
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any inquiry into the meaning and nature of the public is an 
exercise that stands at the heart of political philosophy.  
 Given the state of the Nigerian society, and the 
unfortunate fact that we have not been able to answer this 
political/philosophical question adequately enough, then the 
attempt by Lawuyi to interrogate not only the public space in 
Nigeria, but also its unique configuration stands out as an 
urgent contribution not so much to anthropology but to 
philosophy; and more so, to the philosophy of national 
development in Nigeria. 
 
 Mapping Nigeria’s public space: Between the public 
managers and the sceptical public 
Rethinking the public space, or the public, becomes imperative 
given that Nigeria has been experimenting with democracy for 
quite a while now without any leeway. In fact, Ekeh’s analysis 
of the malady of African politics as an attempt to draw loyalty 
away from the primordial public to the critically starved civic 
public resonates with the Nigerian political situation. We 
therefore welcome “a proposal to a new understanding of our 
society” (Lawuyi, 2012: 1). Lawuyi’s concern with the idea of 
the public is rightly, though with a pinch of doubt, situated 
within the context of “managing democracy” as a badge of 
“global acceptability” as well as the necessity of national 
development.   
 One perplexing uniqueness—(the negative, which 
would soon be obvious, derives from this perplexity)—about 
Lawuyi’s proposal is that we had to begin from the 
“concluding remarks” in order to get an inkling of what he 
actually intends. And this is to argue that “...the fault in our 
development is not in our stars but in our culture, a culture 
experiencing the gradual death of a moral public and thus of 
character as model to be embedded in practical context in 
distinctive ways” (Lawuyi, 2012: 21). In mapping the Nigerian 
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society and its public space, Prof. Lawuyi’s theoretical strategy 
is to distinguish between the sceptical and the moral publics, 
especially with regards to the dynamics of public governance. 
And so, he argues that  
...the sceptical public and not the cynical one, 
has a role to play in directing development, 
but...this does not make it a moral public, for 
both roles are kept distinct in culture to serve 
the public managers in their role of governance. 
Both serve as checks and balances coextensive 
with, and, indeed, constitutive of social life 
generally; the sceptical public checks the public 
managers, while the moral public supervises the 
goings-on between the sceptical publics and the 
public managers (Lawuyi, 2012: 21). 
Let us make two quick points. The first is that Lawuyi’s 
diatribe against the sceptical public actually forms the bedrock 
of his inaugural lecture and therefore is harsher than what this 
concluding concession projects. In fact, the body of the lecture 
rides this public almost out of court while lamenting the 
invisibility of the moral public. The second point is that the 
conceptual distinction upon which the inaugural rests seems a 
superfluous one as far as the architecture of public vigilance in 
a democratic context is concerned.  
 Right from the beginning of the lecture, and without 
any visible and adequate conceptual armament, Prof. Lawuyi 
launched a blazing criticism against scepticism and the 
sceptical public that seems to suggest a long-standing 
intellectual resentment. For instance, after a preamble about 
the evolution of democracy as a Western concept marauding as 
a global prerequisite for development, he immediately 
proposes what would be the direction of his argument in the 
lecture: 
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I will argue in this lecture that while democracy 
has opened up space for more public 
participation in decision making, and 
specifically provided the opportunity to 
challenge the authority for more inclusiveness 
and social reckoning, which takes into serious 
consideration different capabilities and needs, it 
has also become a factor in the cultivation of a 
resistance culture which manifests principally 
as scepticism and social rejection of persons 
and ideas and holds every account and 
performance in suspect. The increasing 
dominance of the sceptics on the public space 
ironically correlates with a decline in the 
population of the moral public; that is, of those 
with the moral capital to define the orientation 
of strategic influence and leverage on 
divisiveness and antagonism, and raise the 
moral imagination for new origination of 
development (Lawuyi, 2012: 2. Emphasis 
added).  
What could have served as some sort of conceptual orientation 
only proves to be a furtherance of the hostility. For Lawuyi, 
the peculiarity of the sceptical public consists of their 
formation as an opposition “to official position within and 
outside of bureaucracies”: 
They think of their opposition as natural and 
commonsensical, and view any action from the 
public managers that may come later as rather 
late, prejudicial, sinister, incompetent and 
suspicious. The solidarity of the sceptical 
public, when and if ever they come together, is 
inherently negative; but they are individually 
and collectively unstable in their constitutions 
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and reconstitution, n their solidarity lasts as 
long as they share the notion of a perceived 
enemy (Lawuyi, 2012: 8. Emphasis added). 
 The supposed vigilance of the sceptical public over the 
activities of government, in the above reading, would therefore 
seem to be negative because that public essentially lies outside 
of government. In other words, the sceptical public’s negative 
character arises from its vindictiveness as an outsider to 
government. For Lawuyi, the sceptical public and its 
membership are free at any time “to carve out a sphere of 
autonomy, to create a space where it can express the creativity, 
integrity and power denied it elsewhere on the public space or 
in the bureaucratic structure maintained by the public 
managers” (Lawuyi, 2012). Prof. Lawuyi goes on to claim that 
it is possible for a public manager to fall in with the sceptical 
public, and when s/he becomes such a sceptic, “he refuses 
appointment or promotion for the worker that was perceived to 
be in the opposition for, who knows, he can be dangerous!” 
(Lawuyi, 2012: 9) If this interpretation is correct, then the 
nature of the sceptical public has been grossly misinterpreted. 
In other words, if, for instance, an impugned public manager 
can conveniently find for him/herself a niche in the sceptical 
public, then Lawuyi must be talking about some other 
conceptual entity rather than political scepticism! 
 Lawuyi recognises the sceptical public as the civil 
society, joined in opposition by the other out-of-power 
political parties. Given this acknowledgement, he then goes on 
to charge this public with making “arriving at a public opinion 
difficult by their appeal to discourse of essentialising identity; 
and, also, an ontological predicating of social categories, and 
moving them into an absolute, metaphysical justification” 
(Lawuyi, 2012: 15). This, in the final analysis, for him, 
constitutes what the Yoruba call “atenumo”, a euphemism for 
socially annoying nagging: “highlighting same thing often and 
Ogirisi: a new journal of African studies vol 9 2012 
55 
 
often in irreconcilable circumstances, to give the greatest 
credence to a representation and opinion” (Lawuyi, 2012).  
 This predilection of the sceptical public for “atenumo” 
contrasts sharply with the solid authority and content of the 
moral public. This public, for Lawuyi “serves as the ultimate 
critical and binding authority, and a conflict resolution body 
endowed with social responsibility and accountability that a 
composite community can develop” (Lawuyi, 2012: 4). To 
become a member of this unique public, there is the need for 
the  
...immersion of most of private self totally in 
public affairs, resolving differences of opinion 
in the public, and without the slightest 
suggestion of selfishness and instrumentality. 
The moral public is empowered by society with 
the ritual of renewal and affirmation of 
‘national/community ideology, repeated several 
times in a community life, and finds itself 
within organizational modality primarily 
because it charts such paths and passages that 
others would leave to chance or consider a risky 
business’ (Lawuyi, 2012: 4-5). 
Lawuyi considers the moral public a “disappearing species” 
especially in our quest for development in Nigeria. For 
instance, in the recent Salami-Katsina-Alu controversy 
regarding the Supreme Court of Nigeria and the issue of 
judicial corruption, Lawuyi laments the culpable silence of this 
public which is facing decimation from cooptation into the 
sceptical public. On the contrary, the moral public ought to 
serve the function of de-essentialising identity, “free it from 
the entanglements which determine its biases and the biases 
towards it, create a moral posturing about the truth, which sets 
people free, and as centre of power and knowledge serve as 
leaders raising social consciousness to new ideals in the 
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process of harmonizing knowledge, wealth and power with 
social ends” (Lawuyi, 2012: 16).  
 One critical point that Lawuyi makes has earlier 
resonated in Ekeh’s analysis of the two public in Africa. 
According to Ekeh, in spite of the old-fashioned ring of 
morality, any politics that eschews it becomes automatically 
destructive. This is revealed in the zero-sum politics which 
characterised the public space in Africa (1975: 111). In other 
words, the rivalry between the civic and the primordial publics 
is aggravated by the fact that the primordial public has enough 
supply of morality which is wanting in the civic public. 
Lawuyi equally recognises the significance of morality in the 
public space “because it is about character and it is about 
human beings and their images, as object of public 
knowledge... [In other words,] What it stamps on public 
discourse is the value of character or image to the 
understanding of man, his capability, and his development” 
(Lawuyi, 2012: 20). It is this moral content that recommends 
the moral public much more than the sceptical one. Finally, 
Lawuyi identifies three reasons why the public space cannot be 
left to the cacophonic noise or “endless disputations” of the 
sceptical public:   
One, the level of ignorance is increasing among 
the other masses made to learn half-truths and 
prejudices that incriminate opposition.... Two, 
the body and mental subjectivity of the public is 
agitated, destabilized and hurt by unending 
disputations raised at every mistake and even 
credible acts.... Third, they have so much 
politicized public discourse at the expense of 
the very need of the nation—the belief in the 
system. That is why an increasing number of 
the citizens are losing faith in her. Nothing in 
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nature is perfect, only faith, commitment and 
hard work make it so! (ibid: 22-23) 
Given these reasons, it becomes crystal clear the intention of 
Lawuyi. This is that the sceptical public lacks the requisite 
patriotic spirit given its commitment to what appears to 
Lawuyi as spurious, and even amoral, disputations. Of course, 
this public brings much pressure to bear on the public 
managers in the spirit of democracy; yet, in the final analysis, 
these same public managers receive “less praise and 
acknowledgement from the sceptical public who ab initio had 
consigned them to a position of distrust. In the final analysis, 
there may be nobody who knows how to do things correctly” 
(ibid: 23). 
 Since the epochal events of September 11, 2001, there 
has been several political onslaught and supposedly democratic 
issues that have led to a critical redaction of the public space in 
the name of antiterrorist policies. These redactional processes 
have culminated in the circumscription of the public space. 
According to Smith and Low, “A creeping encroachment in 
previous years has in the last two decades become an epoch-
making shift culminating in multiple closures, erasures, 
inundations, and transfigurations of public space at the behest 
of state and corporate strategies” (2006: 1). This invasion of 
the public space and sphere is further compounded by the 
experience of bad and authoritarian leadership which refuses to 
play the democratic game. Lawuyi’s concern is with protecting 
the public space from those who will break down its hallowed 
and democratic ramparts with “atenumo”; in this case, the 
sceptical public. My worry is that we are still far from clear 
about the theoretical contour of this sceptical public. It would 
seem to me that, conceptually speaking, the distinction 
between the moral and the sceptical publics is really in vain. 
The sceptical public constitutes the moral voice in most cases, 
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without the essentialising garb Lawuyi robed it in. We will 
clarify this.  
 
Democracy, political scepticism and egemonia 
The public space is rightly the geography of the public sphere. 
To understand the public sphere and its burden of democratic 
possibilities, one must necessarily come to term with the 
public space and its geographical dynamics (Smith and Low, 
2006: 6). Both involve the search for a political and moral 
effectiveness in the dynamics of living good life in an 
organised social community. It is within this public space that 
the democratic processes are crafted as the power arrangement 
which facilitate the quality of the life we live. In this sense, the 
public space becomes a geography constantly under 
contestation by often mutually opposed forces. These forces 
are often represented as the state and the civil society.  
 Usually, the modern state plays the overlord of the 
public space, mapping, controlling and legislating its 
boundaries. This is the essence of what is called the reason of 
state (raison d’état):  
In the imagery of the “nation”, the plurality and 
antagonisms of “society” were moulded into a 
political entity. The nation became the “unitary” 
body in which sovereignty resided … 
“Governing” took on the form of managing the 
“networks of continuous, multiple and complex 
interaction between populations (their increase, 
longevity, health etc), territory (its expanse, 
resources, control, etc), and wealth (its creation, 
productivity, distribution, etc.)”. The artful 
combination of space, people and resources in 
territorialized containment and the policing, 
monitoring and disciplining of the population 
within these spaces became the foundation, and 
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the manifestation of state sovereignty 
(Axtmann, 1998: 6, 8). 
The reason of state therefore created the state as a bounded 
political community pursuing the rationalisation of social life 
in the service of national unity. In political philosophy, the 
civil society stands as the supposed nemesis of the state’s 
rationalisation of the public realm. Yet, if our interpretation is 
correct that the sceptical public is, for Lawuyi, the civil 
society, or a dimension of it, then his characterisation sits 
uneasily within the theoretical universe of those, especially in 
the third world, who considers the civil society as more 
democratic than it is often conceived.  
 One useful, and popular, way of understanding the 
relationship between the state and civil society is to conceive 
the latter as being conceptually separate from and opposed to 
the constitution and operation of the governance dynamics of 
the state (Kenny, 2007: 92). However, the obvious problem 
with this approach is simply that it fails to recognise the 
complex interrelationship and interactions between the two in 
governance. In fact, in most instances, this relationship implies 
a significant tension between the state and the society: 
Civil society is simultaneously arrayed against 
the state and engaged with the state in setting 
the boundaries of public power and guarding its 
own prerogatives. While civil society 
intrinsically resists state encroachment, the 
various interests within civil society also seek to 
influence the state in the exercise of public 
policy and the allocation of valued resources. 
This engagement may be either cordial or 
antagonistic, but it does reflect a common 
recognition of state sovereignty and (at least 
implicit) legitimacy. State and civil society are 
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engaged in a dialogue at arm's-length (Lewis, 
1998: 141). 
Such an engagement is supposed to serve as the template for 
measuring democratic progress in any state. In other words, 
state-society relationship in a democratic society is bound by 
three conceptual issues: “First, the degree of state hegemony, 
denoting the scope of sovereignty and legitimacy, provides a 
framework for assessing the cohesion and stability of the 
political system. Second, political inclusion denotes the extent 
of societal access to the formal political process, and 
consequently indicates the potential arena of participation. 
Third, the concept of engagement suggests the degree of 
societal involvement or commitment to the public realm” (ibid: 
143). While these issues may serve the purpose of comparative 
analysis, they yield a different theoretical result in Africa. This 
is because, as Lewis notes, these issues do not measure up to 
the required framework necessary for democratic consolidation 
which makes the public sphere more of a consensual rather 
than conflictual space. According to him,  
In contrast to the newly democratizing regimes 
of Latin America, East Asia and East Central 
Europe, most African polities are distinguished 
by limited degrees of effective state hegemony, 
a narrow range of political inclusion and highly 
tenuous engagement with autonomous societal 
groups. This is evident from the structure of 
state-society relations in Africa and the trends 
of political and social change during the 
postindependence era (ibid). 
 Of course, colonialism holds the key to the arbitrary 
mapping of the contour of the public space. However, its effect 
on the postcolonial state is such that the state could only 
exercise its authority as domination—as a hegemonic 
leviathan. The formation of a democratic public space 
Ogirisi: a new journal of African studies vol 9 2012 
61 
 
therefore becomes a matter of contestation. And the first rule 
of engagement for the civil society is that of political 
scepticism: the civil society essentially becomes a sceptical 
public. In this respect, I find Billy Dudley’s analysis of the 
dynamics of the postcolonial society in Africa more 
enlightening than Lawuyi’s as a valid contribution to “a 
proposal to a new understanding of our society”. And my 
preference is both conceptual and substantive. 
  In Scepticism and Political Virtue (1975), Dudley 
reflects on the problem solving character of the state and the 
critical role that scepticism plays in generating political 
virtuousness on the part of the citizens conducive to political 
integration. His thesis is that “unless a people cultivate a 
sceptical attitude, or alternatively, unless a governmental 
system accepts and tolerates political scepticism on the part of 
its citizenry, that citizenry cannot exhibit the property of 
virtuousness...” (1975: 9). Nigeria is a plural state, and thus the 
significance of this thesis should be immediately obvious. The 
objective of Prof. Lawuyi is equally not too different from the 
goal of national integration emanating from a belief in the 
system itself. Yet, one obfuscates the imperative more than the 
other. In fact, in the final analysis, Prof. Lawuyi’s proposal (is 
it really?) essentially undermines what he sets out to do.  
 As a problem solving device, the state continually 
addresses one anomaly to the other in its attempt to 
approximate the common good which would make life more 
conducive for its citizens. According to Dudley, 
We can, if we want to, talk about the polity, in 
the jargon of system theorists, in terms of input, 
conversion and output functions, but whatever 
jargon we employ, ultimately, it is the state 
which defines which of the varied issues that 
confront a society at any given time are to b 
regarded as societal problems, how such 
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problems are to be solved, with what tools and 
what are to count as solutions. In time, of 
course, rules are developed in the activity of 
problem solving to govern the processes 
involved, which rules then serve to differentiate 
one system from the other much in the same 
way that by examining the rules which govern 
normal scientific activity, we differentiate 
between paradigms employed by different 
researchers (ibid: 11). 
The last statement in the quotation brings us to Dudley’s 
employment of the Kuhnian idea of a paradigm as an analogy 
with which we can come to term with the problem solving 
capacity of the state. In this sense, and just like a scientific 
paradigm, the state and its framework of rules equally exhibit 
serious anomalies resulting from its inability to get past some 
problems. However, unlike the activity of normal science 
which tends to uncover anomalies, the state invariably 
suppresses them within the logic of system maintenance (ibid: 
12). The problem with this logic of swallowing anomalies is 
that it makes it difficult for the state to articulate the progress 
of such a polity in terms of the political, economic and social 
improvement in the lives of its citizens.  
 This is where the ideas of scepticism and political 
virtue become critical for Dudley. It should be expected, 
within the theoretical thread woven by Lawuyi, that scepticism 
and political virtue would occupy diametrically opposed 
conceptual poles. Yet, for Dudley, scepticism constitutes an act 
of virtuous commitment to the state! Given that every polity 
has some measure of inertia which encourages giving up “the 
intractable for the tractable,” then it stands to reason why 
paradigmatic anomalies would be suppressed especially when 
they do not fit into the structure of the already established 
rules. On the contrary, 
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It is however the case that unless anomalies 
occur we cannot adequately test, or put 
differently, articulate, a paradigm. As I have 
sought to show, progress, in one of its senses, 
consists in the continuous articulation and 
elaboration of a paradigm through the 
resolution of anomalies. For the polity this can 
be possible...only through the inculcation of a 
sceptical outlook. For scepticism, as I have used 
it, the withholding of assent till justification is 
given, serves essentially to bring out anomalies 
in the problem-solving rules of the polity, and 
without anomalies being generated there can be 
no progress, only a deadening sterility (ibid: 
14). 
For a polity like Nigeria to make progress in its effort at 
national integration therefore requires the evolution of a 
sceptical public that would engage the anomalies generated by 
the rules of the state.  
At the conceptual level, Dudley, unlike Lawuyi, begins 
his analysis through a clarification of the meaning of 
scepticism in his reflection. His understanding of scepticism is 
contrasted to the Hegelian “negativity of withdrawal or self-
alienation” or the philosophical scepticism which denies the 
existence of the external world. Rather, scepticism implies “a 
general intellectual outlook...which does not deny assent but 
withholds it until justification is given” (ibid: 5). At this 
epistemological level, scepticism serves the purpose of making 
a state responsible for whatever decisions it makes on behalf of 
the citizens. To justify is therefore to render government’s 
public acts—policies and programmes—legitimate: “[T]o 
justify would thus be to offer a statement (or set of statements) 
the acceptance of which not only enables us to understand why 
a given act was initiated or a policy promulgated, but also 
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enjoins on us, if not the obligation to accept the act or policy, 
then certainly the duty to suspend judgement about the act or 
policy, and therefore to react in a manner which could be 
construed, epiphenomenally, as acceptance” (ibid: 7).  
Scepticism steps into the political interstice within 
which the state struggle to suppress anomalies through an 
active attempt to bring the leadership to the justification level 
that would motivate the assent crucial for integration. In this 
sense, it would seem that, just like the British example Dudley 
cites, the dialectics of Nigerian political history can be read in 
terms of a resistance to paradigm elaboration. And, 
fundamentally, this is what makes scepticism, and the sceptical 
public, a critical part of the public space in Nigeria. 
“Atenumo,” or socio-political nagging then becomes a crucial 
democratic factor standing between the resistance to paradigm 
elaboration in the face of anomalies and the imperative of auto-
commitment to the Nigerian state. Why does Lawuyi not 
acknowledge this role of the sceptical public? 
This sceptical public serves one final function which, it 
seems to me, critically undercuts the distinction on which 
Lawuyi erects his inaugural. I argue that in the face of the 
amorality of the civic public and its resistance to paradigm 
elaboration and articulation, then the sceptical public assumes 
a moral mantle similar to what Gramsci calls intellectual and 
moral leadership. This type of leadership generates egemonia 
contrasted to the hegemony or domination by the state. And 
the egemonia of the sceptical public becomes imperative in the 
face of the hegemonic deficit of the Nigerian state and its 
leadership.  
The concept of hegemony has an interesting history. In 
Aristotle, the hegemon constitutes the fundamental basis of 
politics which is regarded as “the art of ruling a republic 
according to justice and reason” (Viroli, 2001: 2). Within this 
context, the hegemon becomes a form of rule “directed to the 
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interest of the led, and not to the establishment of a general 
system of slavery” (Aristotle, 1995: 287). In other words, the 
hegemon is a ruler whose exercise of power derives from the 
consent and interest of the people. However, given what Viroli 
calls the “revolution of politics” between 1250 and 1500, 
hegemony’s original meaning became transformed alongside 
the diminution of the meaning of politics as “reason of state—
in the sense of the knowledge of the means of preserving 
domination over a people” (Viroli, 2001: 2). Hegemony is 
eventually rescued by Antonio Gramsci in the twentieth 
century through his rearticulation of the meaning of politics 
and hegemonic leadership, or egemonia.  
For Gramsci, the concept of hegemony involves the 
quality of moral and intellectual leadership (or direzione). 
Beginning from what he calls politica attiva (or, active 
politics), Gramsci argues that it is politics and the political 
“that gives meaning and purpose to the world, and that 
establishes the conditions and goals through which the social 
and historical transformation of reality is attained” (Fontana, 
1993: 69-70). Following from this, the intellectual and moral 
reform championed by Gramsci involves the excavation of a 
new conception of reality away from the existing structure of 
the established system. Hegemony, for him, consists of two 
roots, dominare (to dominate) and egemonia (leadership); or a 
balancing of force and consent. The Nigerian state, as it is 
now, fits Gramsci’s characterisation of hegemony as 
domination.  On the contrary, the attempt by the sceptical 
public, or the civil society, to press the state into paradigm 
elaboration involves moral-intellectual leadership of the 
masses. This leadership essentially involves the establishment 
of a philosophy of praxis and a new democratic culture around 
which the redefinition of reality is founded. At this point, 
Gramsci’s egemonia meets not only Aristotle’s idea of the 
hegemon, but also his concept of politike koinonia, an ethical-
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political community of free, equal and diverse citizens who 
participate in ruling and being ruled, as well as the 
constraining and challenging of intrusive state power (Lewis, 
1998: 140; Kenny, 2007: 92; Cohen, 1998: 1481). 
This analysis implies that the relevance of the sceptical 
public lies in its constant attempt at rupturing the hegemonic 
framework of the Nigerian state in order to get the paradigm to 
work itself off its mounting anomalies rather than the supposed 
essentialising of identity identified by Lawuyi. In fact, as 
Laclau insists, the task of the popular leadership that the 
sceptical public provides “consists...of providing the 
marginalized masses with a language out of which it becomes 
possible for them to reconstitute a political identity and a 
political will” (1996: 49. Emphasis added). In other words, this 
popular leadership constituted by the sceptical public attempts 
the transformation of the masses from an unruly one into what 
Gramsci calls an active and organised people (populo armato) 
capable of initiating moral and intellectual reform. The popular 
leadership, in its united front against paradigmatic anomalies, 
also achieves the consensus formation critical to egemonia.  
In the final analysis, we may not be able to escape the 
conclusion, identified within Dudley’s analysis of scepticism 
and political virtue, that “those who deny a place for 
scepticism in politics seek not to preserve the State; they in 
fact undermine the State” (1975: 21). This, indeed, may be a 
far too extreme conclusion to attach to Lawuyi’s intellectual 
effort in Sceptical Public, Public Managers and the Decline of 
Moral Public on Nigeria’s Public Space. However, given the 
glaring conceptual vacuum in the inaugural, the charge 
becomes inevitable. 
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